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What
does TEMPEST stand for?
TEMPEST is not an acronym, though words have
been used to fit TEMPEST that sound almost plausible
What is
TEMPEST?
Data passing through circuitry
and mechanical devices produce electromagnetic emanations, by tuning
into these emanations the data can be reconstituted.
Traditionally TEMPEST only applied to emanations where the
reconstituted the data could be classed as compromising over a
certain level of CLASSIFICATION. These
days the term TEMPEST seems to apply to any data that can be
reconstituted using the electromagnetic output. That's all I'm
prepared to say, others have put some comprehensive explanations on
the Net, a search will find them.
Is
my data under threat from a TEMPEST attack?
TEMPEST attacks don't come cheap, consider
the following and then ask yourself whether someone would find your data that
valuable
Equipment, TEMPEST testing equipment doesn't
come cheap, myths about using Radio Shack receivers are unfounded.
Furthermore, TEMPEST equipment vendors are restricted in whom they can sell
their products to.
Training, TEMPEST training takes many weeks
and believe me, each week feels like an eternity, in addition to the training
you need experience and lots of it. Training isn't given to just anyone,
TEMPEST testers are usually "checked out" to ensure that they are
unlikely to be subverted to the "dark side" prior to starting
training. Therefore your tester won't come cheap.
Opportunity, The attacker must be in range to
carry out the spatial or line attack, therefore there must be an adjacent room,
building or parking lot that you cannot check on a regular basis
Time, An attack can take a long time
So is your data that valuable that anyone
would carry out the above in order to attack you?
How
can I defend my data?
Separation, Put as much distance between the
target and the possible attack locations as possible, this applies to both
spatial and line borne attacks
How can I best achieve separation?
1. Identify data that is under
sufficient threat of attack, identify equipment that is used to process this
data include lines, mains, VDUs, printers hubs etc.
2. Identify possible attack locations
3. Reduce attack locations, carry out routine checks of empty
offices, restrict parking in the vicinity of the building especially for vans
etc
4. Where possible group your target equipment together in a location
as far from the attack locations as possible
Shielding, You can shield individual
equipment or entire rooms/buildings, shielding is very expensive and beyond the
scope of this document
Filtering, Any lines attached to the
equipment could be at risk therefore identify any signal/control or mains lines
and filter them. Low/no cost solutions include fibre optics and UPS, there
are other examples but I'll leave that to your common sense.
Why
are VDUs most at risk from attack?
VDU's repeat the same information at around
85 times per second (depending on the refresh rate)
Will
using LCD screens offer protection?
Yes and no ;o) LCD screens themselves
in theory emit less than a VDU however recent EMC controls have greatly reduced
emanations from VDUs, the result is that often the graphics card will be the
greatest source of compromise.
How
can I reduce the risk from my VDU's being attacked?
Use a screensaver to frustrate attacks, use
monitors from reputable vendors that meet EMC standards. If you are very
paranoid use soft fonts that are harder to reconstitute.
Are
you telling me everything I need to know?
No, I'm merely trying to help you assess the
risk and put in place some interim countermeasures. If you are a
Government or Military agency seek advice from your TEMPEST authority.
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